What’s wrong with comparisons in philosophy papers?

Student: “Hi, I want to write my thesis on what Leibniz and Chalmers think about qualia.” 

Professor: “Why?”

Student: “Well, I want to study what Leibniz thinks and then compare that with Chalmers’ view. Then I’m going to see what I like better and write my conclusion.”

Professor: “I see. But why?”

Student: “OK, I could pick Chalmers and Dennett on consciousness instead.”

Professor: “Right! But why?”

Of course, the dramatis personae can be changed in various ways, but you haven’t been long enough in academia, if you haven’t encountered this kind of conversation. The kind of paper is ubiquitous and it has a typical structure: An all too brief Introduction is followed by Chapter 1 on author X, Chapter 2 on author Y, Chapter 3 comparing X and Y, and a tentative conclusion on why Y seems perhaps a bit superior. To keep the reader “in suspense”, such pieces commonly do not reveal the preference offered in the conclusion until the last moment and in fact they often seem to be written without any inkling as to what will be in the conclusion. As I see it, this is a very bad practice. So what’s wrong with it? Although I’ve done this sort of thing myself and although I think it’s really problematic, I find it difficult to pin down clearly what exactly is wrong with it. Let’s try then.

First off, though, let me stress that a lot of comparisons are fine. And even those that might seem close to the typical structure mentioned above are often ok. The problem is not owing to comparisons as such but to illusions about neutrality (presenting all items or authors in apt length) and a lack of a proper point of contact or aspect of the comparison (i.e. a proper tertium comparationis). What’s hard about telling good from bad comparisons is that the assessment of what actually is a proper aspect is not obvious. But let’s not get ahead of schedule.

Order of exploration versus presentation. – Generally, the order in which you explore a topic does not need to follow the order in which you present it. It’s crucial to see that comparisons guide our understanding. The “oh, this is like that” impression is what allows us to relate something new or unknown to what we already know. Seeing similarities in different things (and seeing differences in what we take to be alike) is how we acquire access to new things. Once we realise that Leibniz treats issues that we discuss under the label of consciousness it’s natural to relate it to what we know about consciousness. If we then move on to the fancy discussions in Chalmers, why not relate the two? There is nothing wrong with that. That’s how we learn and explore a field of discussion. However, understanding something (better) by comparison does not entail that the comparison sheds any light on the ongoing discussion about consciousness or Leibniz’ or Chalmers’ views. That we recognise a relation between between things does not of itself make it relevant to talk about our way of recognising it. Now, don’t get me wrong! Of course, you are free to talk about anything you like. But usually your talking about something is directed at a listener or reader or a broader audience. Presenting something to an audience supposes that it’s relevant to your audience. But not everything that is relevant to your understanding something is relevant to your audience. Likewise, it’s not relevant to someone eating what you cooked for them to witness your preparation of the meal. So ask yourself how what was relevant to your understanding might be different from what is relevant for your audience. This is what is called motivating the presentation of a topic. You motivate your presentation not in terms of your means of understanding but in terms of the state of the art.

How do you tell the difference between these orders? – There is no magic trick to tell these orders apart. Sometimes the relation is really interesting (to the audience); sometimes it’s just a tool for your own thinking. In the latter case, you should ask yourself what precisely you find enlightening for your discussion of, say, consciousness. A technical term or concept? A metaphor? An example? A whole argument? Most of the time, you’ll find that it’s just one particular aspect. But to introduce such an aspect, you usually don’t need to write a whole chapter on author X, striking out in all directions, to enlighten something in Y. Apply Ockham’s Razor! Once you realise which aspect you’re interested in, the need for a comparison of X and Y falls away. What you really want to talk about is the particular aspect in Y. For the structure of your presentation, this means that you can skip chapters 1 and 2, and start with chapter 3. But instead of a comparison, you just focus on the particular aspect in Y.

But what about …? – Planning essays with students, it’s typically at this suggestion that certain assumptions kick in. Some of the following reactions are likely: (1) “But then I don’t have enough to say!” Beginners often think that working through a given question is not enough. Rest assured, though. Once the question is broken down into subquestions, there will likely be rather too much than too little to say. (2) “But I have to give an apt account of all the positions involved!” No, you don’t! What you have to cover is the relevant aspect. Yet, there is a widespread assumption that, in order to pick an aspect from X, you have to show how that aspect figures in X’s overall work. Behind this are two related worries: The worry that you get the aspect wrong when you ignore the rest or the worry that the presentation of the aspect is not adequate if it is stripped of its context. The first worry is, again, a matter of exploration, not of presentation. The second worry goes deeper. It’s an art to present something both concisely and adequately. But unless a holistic understanding of the aspect is the precise topic, this is the point to rely on literature. Most often you’ll find that there is ample literature on some related aspect in X. – The upshot is: Address these worries by relying on literature rather than trying to figure out everything by yourself. Like everthing else, philosophy is team work. The bottom line is: Focus on the aspect in Y, not in X. Invoke X only if you need this as a context that sheds light on the aspect in question.

What if you actually want to present a comparison? – While most issues can be tackled by focussing on one part of an initially planned comparison, sometimes there actually is something to compare. This is the case when you think that X has actually influenced Y or when X promises to shed new light on the understanding of Y. Of course, in this case the focus will be on an aspect or a set of aspects, too. But rather than a mere tool for learning, the comparison is actually itself an advancement of the state of the art. In this case, it’s crucial to begin by focussing on the motivation first. Why or in what respect would this be relevant to our joint understanding? If you can’t answer that question, it’s better to apply Ockham’s Razor again. If you can, you will probably have no reason to adhere to the boring structure of presenting X and Y before you actually move to the comparison. At most, you will coinfine yourself to how they treat the aspect in question. But whatever you do, don’t leave the question of what you think about the issue for the conclusion. Your “opinion” is not an addition to the comparison. It’s what drives the comparison in the first place. So figuring out the aspect in question and why it is relevant to make the comparison just is your opinion. Thus, it’s not a matter for the conclusion but for the introduction where you motivate why the comparison is relevant.

2 thoughts on “What’s wrong with comparisons in philosophy papers?

    1. Thanks – spot on!

      I think the last paragraph of your piece is worth quoting fully:

      “As well as being a source of many insights into Cavendish and Conway’s respective metaphysical views, I also found Lascano’s text to be a useful exercise in thinking about the benefits (and drawbacks) of employing comparisons in the history of philosophy more generally. On more than one occasion, my own research has been stimulated by noting that various thinkers have strikingly, and often surprisingly, similar views. I originally began working on Cavendish, for example, because I realised that she develops a very similar argument to what would come to be known as the primary-secondary quality distinction as Berkeley (on whom I wrote my PhD thesis). It seemed not only interesting but historically important to me that two thinkers, Cavendish (a materialist) and Berkeley (an immaterialist), with seemingly very different worldviews both agreed that primary and secondary qualities could not really be separated from one another, even in conception (according to those who accept the distinction, primary qualities, like shape, are mind-independent while secondary qualities, like colour, are mind-dependent). In turn, I felt that this might tell us something
      about how such thinkers ended up opposing substance dualism in favour of their own brand of ‘monism’ (vitalist, materialism monism in Cavendish’s case/ immaterialist monism in Berkeley’s). What I ultimately ended up writing, however, was a paper on Cavendish, with a footnote on Berkeley (West, “Margaret Cavendish on Conceivability, Possibility, and the Case of Colours”). One reason for this was the resistance my initial comparative idea received from the relevant scholarly community.

      In peer review, for example, I found myself facing questions like: Is this a Cavendish paper or a Berkeley paper? Or: what insights does this comparison provide that could not have been provided by a study of either Cavendish or Berkeley? In a sense, then, I am pleased that Lascano has been able to develop a monograph premised on something like my initial thought: that holding up two thinkers’ views alongside each other is interesting in itself. On the other hand, as is often the case with referees’ comments (even if one does not always want to admit it), I think there is value in the questions that were asked about my own attempts to compare two thinkers. And I think some of those questions are not clearly answered by Lascano’s text. Lascano’s discussions of Cavendish and Conway often run in parallel rather than in conjunction with one another. Given that, it seems to me that there is scope for more explicit discussion of what exactly we learn by holding the two of them up alongside one another. Again, while I admire Lascano’s commitment to letting Cavendish and Conway’s writing show us what she thinks it shows, as a reader I would have liked to be told, even just a little bit, more.”

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